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The above is my reading..
Test yourself on Political Compass. via Bill Gusky
WW II confirmed that the whole of reality was some sort of stage set that could be cleared away at a moments notice. I do tend to write a fiction of extreme situations, there's no point in denying that. But then, life on this planet for the most part is fairly extreme….the life I led during the Second World War was not untypical at all, in fact it was completely typical of the way most people on this planet have lived during the 20th century and in previous centuries…what is the untypical corner of the planet has been the sort of secure suburbia of England, Western Europe, and the United States.
I have a suspicion that some sort of institutionalized violence which we see in the violent contact sports like boxing, American Football, [Soccer Hooliganism] etc, are not "outlets" of violence but rather means of prompting and provoking it because we need to get that sort of violence into our systems because they are energizing and they do have a virtue because they sharpen the moral sense of ourselves….
You could make the point that in a way the great dream of the Enlightenment- of a sane and humane society, where we all respect each other is in a sense hopelessly idealistic and does not accord with our real natures. That we are a race of partly-civilized hunter killers who've adapted loosely to living in large enclaves. If we are going to be truthful about our real natures and that we are rather violent creatures who enjoy violence…it might be necessary to administer small doses of not just violence, but psychopathic behavior.
It is difficult for one to whom the state has been sold not to sell it in his turn, and recover from the weak the gold which the strong have extorted from him. Sooner or later, under such an administration everything becomes venal; and the peace which is then enjoyed under kings is worse than the disturbances of interregnums.
... [T]he greatest good of all, which ought to be the goal of every system of law, ... comes down to two main objects: freedom and equality: freedom because any individual dependence means that much strength withdrawn from the body or the state, and equally because freedom cannot survive without it. I have already explained what civil freedom is; as for equality, this word must not be taken to imply that degrees of power and wealth should be absolutely the same for all ... no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself ...
To renounce freedom is to renounce one's humanity, one's rights as a man and equally one's duties. There is no quid pro quo for one who renounces everything ... if you take away all freedom of the will, you strip a man's actions of all moral significance.
Anekantavada is a basic principle of Jainism developed by Mahavira (599-527 BC) positing that reality is perceived differently from different points of view, and that no single point of view is completely true. Jain doctrine states that only Kevalis, those who have infinite knowledge, can know the true answer, and that all others would only know a part of the answer. Anekantavada is related to the Western philosophical doctrine of Subjectivism.'Ekanta' is one-sidedness. Anekantavada is literally the doctrine of non-onesidedness; it is often translated as "non-absolutism".Anekantvada encourages its adherents to consider others views or beliefs. They should not reject a view simply because it uses a different perspective. They should consider the fact there may be truth in others' views too.Many proponents of Anekantvada apply the principle to religion and philosophy themselves, reminding adherents that any religion or philosophy, even Jainism, that clings too dogmatically to its own tenets is committing an error based on its limited point of view. In this application, Anekantvada resembles the Western principles of cultural and moral relativism.
Margolis is the current day champion of the ancient Protagoras in that he takes the latter’s dictum “Man the Measure” to its logical conclusions, showing how, strictly adhering to such a measure, all fixities and changeless first principles must give way to consensual, though not criterial, truth claims. Since “man”, the measure, is himself a creature of history, no modal claims of invariance can possibly be sustained. Margolis however avers that there need be no fixities either de re or de dicto or de cogitatione. The world is a flux and our thought about it is also in flux. Margolis sees the whole history of Western Philosophy as a struggle between the advocates of change and those who either, like Parmenides, deny that change is intelligible at all, or those, like Heraclitus, who find some logos or some law which allegedly governs whatever changes are admitted. Contrary to “postmodern” philosophers like Richard Rorty or Jean-François Lyotard, he shows that our lacking cognitive privilege means that the need for a philosophical justification of our choices and programs becomes more, not less, pressing now than at any previous time.